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“Once upon a time, I ...

dreamt I was a butterfly...
Soon I awaked, and
there I was, veritably
myself again.
Now I do not know
whether I was
then a man
dreaming
I
was a
butterfly, or
whether I am
now a butterfly,
dreaming
I am a man.”

The
Innovation
and

Limitations
of Arbitral
Courts

– ZHUANGZI
CHINESE PHILOSOPHER C. 369–286 BC

BY PAMELA K. BOOKMAN

Judicature

In recent years, governments
from the state of Delaware to the
Emirate of Dubai have created
institutions specially designed
to adjudicate transnational commercial disputes. These institutions
are hybrids between courts and arbitration, or “arbitral courts.”1 Arbitral
courts seek to adapt the most popular features of arbitral tribunals and
courts in order to accommodate the
growing challenges of such cases.
Arbitral courts mimic arbitration’s
traditional features to some degree.
They have internationally wellregarded judges who may also work
as arbitrators. They claim the neutrality, the expertise, and sometimes
the privacy and confidentiality of
international arbitration. Unlike arbitration, however, they bind third
parties, develop transnational law, and
wield the power of the state.
There is much to applaud about the
innovation of arbitral courts. But it
is important to consider what limits
should cabin this innovation. Arbitral
courts unsettle the traditional distinctions between public and private
adjudication, and this blurring has
significant consequences not only for
understanding the state of the evolving international judicial system, of
which U.S. courts have historically
been an important part, but also for the
future of legitimacy and transparency
in dispute resolution around the world.
Arbitral courts often claim legitimacy on grounds that combine
arbitrators’ and courts’ claims to legitimacy. The legitimacy of arbitration
mostly flows from parties’ consent
to the arrangement, whereas courts’
legitimacy, at least those courts situated within democracies, derives more
broadly from social compacts and customs, including from the democratic
legitimacy of the state.
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Arbitral courts unsettle
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Standing at the crossroads of public
and private adjudication, however, arbitral courts could abuse their position
by exercising jurisdiction in contexts
beyond the scope of what gives them
legitimacy (e.g., parties’ consent) or by
closing off public access. There is a significant risk that they will do both of
these things. Like arbitration centers’
rules, arbitral courts’ rules tend to be
flexible. The courts often have substantial discretion over issues like whether
to join third parties who have not consented to jurisdiction and whether to
grant parties’ requests to keep the proceedings and decisions confidential,
which tends to result in keeping proceedings secret. Exercising exorbitant
jurisdiction and proceeding in secret,
however, could undermine an arbitral
court’s reputation for evenhandedness,
its perceived legitimacy, and its potential to develop transnational law.
In light of these risks, I offer two
suggestions for arbitral courts looking to build their own legitimacy and
to contribute to improvements in judicial institutional design. First, arbitral

courts should restrict their jurisdiction
in light of their hybridized source of
legitimacy that draws on their resemblance to both a court and an arbitral
tribunal. Second, arbitral courts should
prioritize the public nature of proceedings and decisions and not defer to
parties’ requests for confidentiality.

WHAT ARE ARBITRAL COURTS?
Arbitral courts are at the vanguard
of international commercial dispute
resolution. They are domestic institutions designed to hear cases involving
actors or controversies that cross borders. As such, they are an important
addition to the “international judicial
system.”2 They represent an important
trend in transnational and commercial
litigation that should be watched carefully, and that hold potential lessons in
institutional design relevant to courts
everywhere.
Arbitral courts are domestic courts
that have the following arbitrationlike characteristics: they (1) allow party
autonomy over procedures, (2) proceed in English, (3) permit parties to
opt into confidentiality, and (4) exercise jurisdiction based on consent,
often without further connections
to the locality. They often (5) employ
foreign judges, (6) have judges sit in
three-judge panels, (7) offer opportunities for foreign lawyers to appear
without local counsel, (8) allow parties
to opt out of the right to appeal, and (9)
are willing to enforce parties’ selection of non-state law to govern their
dispute. Some of these traits are common to all arbitral courts, and some
are typical but not necessarily found
in each example of an arbitral court.
Regardless of the precise collection of
arbitration-like characteristics, arbitral courts reveal a trend that extends
beyond recognized ways in which
courts, even commercial courts, have
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been catering to private parties and
their disputes, mimicking arbitration,
and, as we shall see, neglecting their
roles as public institutions.
Using the term arbitral courts recognizes that these entities are domestic
courts. They are not international courts
like, for example, the International
Court of Justice. Individual states3 create and fund them (at least as a formal
matter). Nor are they actually private
arbitral tribunals. They render binding decisions enforceable by the power
of the state. They can issue subpoenas
and interim relief. They can join or bind
non-consenting third parties. Under
common law traditions, they can
declare law and establish precedent.
But arbitral courts nevertheless
closely resemble arbitration.4 Arbitral
courts build on the efforts of commercial courts to respond to parties’
preferences for speed, flexibility, and
expertise.5 In a number of ways, procedure in commercial courts has become
increasingly privatized — through
managerial judging, court-annexed
arbitration, and increased party control over procedures. Arbitral courts
take these efforts several steps further. Arbitral courts may employ
foreign judges, allow foreign lawyers
to appear before them, and permit parties to opt out of appeals. They operate
in English (even in non-English-speaking countries). They allow parties to
choose which forum hears the dispute (regardless of the forum state’s
connection to the dispute), which
procedures apply, whether the proceedings or the resulting decision will
be kept confidential, and what law governs the dispute, potentially even if
parties select non-state-created law,
like general equitable principles, or
rules articulated by organizations like
the United Nations Commission on
International Trade Law (UNCITRAL).

When courts are
transparent about their
proceedings or decisionmaking, or when courts
entrust parties with questions
of confidentiality, they cross
a line that compromises their
effectiveness — in dispute
resolution, in law making,
beyond.

and

Delaware provided an early and
important example of an arbitral court.
In 2009, Delaware enacted a statute allowing Chancery Court judges
to act as arbitrators.6 For controversies involving at least one Delaware
business entity, no consumers, and
amounts in dispute over $1 million, the
parties could agree to have a Chancery
Court judge arbitrate their dispute.
The proceedings would be confidential
and held in the Delaware courthouse
for a filing fee of $12,000, plus $6,000
for each additional hearing day.
Regular Chancery Court procedure and
evidence rules would apply, but the
parties could agree to modify them.7
The judges could grant any remedy
they “deem[ed] just and equitable and
within the scope of any applicable
agreement of the parties.”8 The losing party could appeal the “order of the
Court of Chancery” to the Delaware
Supreme Court, but subject to Federal
Arbitration Act standards of review.
The arbitration petitions and decisions would be confidential, but once
appealed they could become part of
the public record.9 Delaware designed
the statute, Chief Justice Myron Steele
explained, “to keep the United States,
and in particular, Delaware, competitive in international business dispute
resolution.”10

In 2013, a panel of the Third
Circuit declared that these “government-sponsored arbitrations” violated
the First Amendment’s right of public access to trials because of their
confidential nature. The Third Circuit
judges in Delaware Coalition for Open
Government v. Strine debated whether
the Delaware statute created a court
that had some arbitration-like features
(like confidentiality, optional procedural rules, limited appellate review),
which would require public access,
or an arbitral tribunal that had some
court-like features (Delaware Chancery
judges, Delaware courthouse), which
would not. In fractured decisions, two
of the three judges thought Delaware
had unconstitutionally created confidential courts.11 Delaware’s courts had
to be open to the public.12
The Third Circuit thus thwarted
Delaware’s attempt to create a
court-arbitration hybrid — what this
article calls an “arbitral court.”13
The Third Circuit’s decision reflects
both conventional civil procedure theory and arbitration theory about the
dividing line between courts and arbitration. Courts are public, “procedurally
rigorous,” and state-sponsored; arbitration is private, “faster and cheaper
but with fewer procedural safeguards.”14 Courts’ authority derives
from the state; their power extends
as far as the state’s. Arbitration, by
contrast, is a “creature of contract.”15
The parties’ agreement both defines
and limits arbitral tribunals’ authority. While scholars have recognized
a convergence of procedures in different fora16 and bemoaned both the
privatization of court procedure17 and
the judicialization of arbitration,18 the
understanding was that courts and
arbitration stay in their lanes.19
While the Third Circuit saw
Delaware’s arbitral court as a bridge
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too far, the idea has had a more positive reception elsewhere. International
commercial courts that mimic traits
from arbitration have been established
in Dubai (2004), Singapore (2015), and
the Netherlands (2019).20 In the same
period, tax havens such as Bermuda,
the British Virgin Islands, and the
Cayman Islands, the place of incorporation for many foreign firms, have
established new business courts that
“resemble commercial arbitration.”21
This article considers Delaware’s
government-sponsored
arbitration
experiment, some international commercial courts,22 and these offshore
courts to be “arbitral courts.”

ARE ARBITRAL COURTS PUBLIC
OR PRIVATE?
Arbitral courts shift and blur traditional boundaries between public and
private adjudication. The lessons from
arbitral courts are, in part, positive lessons about the power of procedural
innovation and forum shopping, which
I have explored in previous work.23
But as institutions at the crossroads
of public and private adjudication,
arbitral courts reveal not only the
possibilities but also the limits of
experimentation and party autonomy
over procedure, especially over questions of confidentiality.
By combining attributes of both litigation and arbitration, as Hiro Aragaki
has explained, courts like the arbitral
court in Singapore reject “an either/or
choice between public and private adjudication; instead, they think of dispute
resolution holistically, all the while borrowing one device from one process
and glomming it on to another without
so much as an afterthought.”24 Courts
and their designers seem to be throwing traditional distinctions to the wind.
But can arbitral courts coherently
reject public/private distinctions in
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all senses? While there is a flexibility
in the distinction between public and
private adjudication in many respects,
there are and should be limits. Here I
focus on two.
First, there should be consistency
between a court’s claim to legitimacy
and its jurisdictional reach. If a court
claims legitimacy based on the consent
of the parties before it, then its jurisdiction should be so limited, just as an
arbitral tribunal’s jurisdiction would
be. That consent should not justify the
court reaching beyond what would
otherwise be the limits of its jurisdiction as it applies to parties and disputes
beyond what the consenting parties
have agreed to.
Second, arbitral courts, like all courts,
are public institutions. When courts
are not transparent about their proceedings or decision-making, or when
courts entrust parties with questions
of confidentiality, they cross a line that
compromises their effectiveness — in
dispute resolution, in law making, and
beyond. Dispute resolution behind a
veil of opacity intentionally hides these
functions from public observation and,
thus, dispenses with any obligation of
justification.25 Trust in arbitral courts
then becomes solely a function of blind
trust. Transparency, then, contributes
to the growth of arbitral courts by promoting their legitimacy, effectiveness,
and their ability to develop transnational law.

LEGITIMACY, JURISDICTION,
AND ENFORCEABILITY
To attract cases and to ensure their
decisions are widely enforceable, arbitral courts will need to establish both
legal and sociological legitimacy.26
Legitimacy is a complex concept.27
To function, a court needs the public
to perceive it as both “playing an appropriate role in . . . governance” and

“making its decisions based on ‘law,’
not ‘politics’ or ‘personal preferences.’”28 Put another way, both courts
and arbitration need both sociological legitimacy and legal legitimacy.
The sociological legitimacy of a court
depends on whether the public views
the court “as worthy of respect and
obedience.”29 Legal legitimacy is established by using accepted interpretive
methods and fair procedures.30
The central source of international
commercial arbitration’s sociological and legal legitimacy is freedom of
contract. As discussed below, decisionmakers (arbitrators) also lend sociological legitimacy because of who they
are and how they are chosen. The wide
respect for freedom of contract and
the structure of arbitration has led to
an international structure of support
built by international treaties, national
courts, and private interests.
Courts generally have different
sources of sociological legitimacy
— including from the state. In democracies, for example, courts have
democratic legitimacy.31 In non-democratic states, courts sometimes lend
legitimacy to the state as opposed to the
other way around. That is, “to varying
degrees, [authoritarian regimes] also
attempt to make up for questionable
procedural legitimacy by preserving
judicial institutions that give the image,
if not the full effect, of constraints on
arbitrary rule.”32
Arbitral courts rely both on arbitration’s sources of legitimacy as well as
on the authority of the state. That is,
like arbitration, arbitral courts seem
both sociologically and legally legitimate in large part because parties have
chosen to have their disputes adjudicated there.33
For decades now, it has become commonplace that courts can adjudicate
disputes based on forum selection
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clauses even if the parties and the
dispute have no ties to the forum.34
Parties can consent to jurisdiction in
courts just like they can in arbitration,
thereby giving the court or arbitral tribunal jurisdiction over a set of parties
and a set of disputes that they might
not otherwise have.
When they do so, it would seem
logical that arbitral courts, like arbitration, would limit their jurisdiction to
the case that the parties chose to submit to them. But this is not usually the
assumption. Ordinarily, once parties
have consented to a court’s jurisdiction, the court exercises the full force
of its powers as an arm of the state —
including the power to issue subpoenas
and injunctive relief and to consolidate cases not subject to the parties’
forum agreement. Moreover, unlike
what typically happens in arbitration,
the parties’ consent does not limit the
court’s jurisdiction to the parties who
have consented to that jurisdiction.
That is, consent-based court jurisdiction results in cases where ordinary
courts can issue subpoenas to third
parties, join third parties, and otherwise consolidate cases — even when
there is no other territorial basis,
beyond the presence of the consenting parties, for the court’s jurisdiction.
Indeed, part of courts’ attractiveness as
a forum is that they can bind third parties and adjudicate some kinds of cases
(like business torts) that might not be
able to be subject to arbitration.35
This is true for arbitral courts as well,
even if their only claim to jurisdiction
is the original parties’ consent. For
example, the Singapore International
Commercial Court (SICC), established
in 2015, is one of the most celebrated
arbitral courts. Once the SICC has
jurisdiction over a case because two
contracting parties consented to have
the SICC hear their contractual dis-
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It is circular to ask the courts’
consent-based legitimacy to
support the state’s legitimacy
as a sovereign, while also
asking the state’s power to
extend the arbitral court’s
power beyond its original
source: the parties’ consent.
putes, the court has the full power of
the state to include in the proceedings
additional parties who may not have
consented.36 Indeed, the SICC rules
grant the court expansive authority to
join non-consenting parties, including
the authority to name them as additional plaintiffs or defendants — even
if, apart from this joinder, they have
no other connection to Singapore and
Singapore would otherwise lack judicial jurisdiction over them.37 Such
joinder is not typically available in
arbitration; the arbitral tribunal’s jurisdiction is set — and limited — by the
scope of the parties’ agreement.
This result in arbitral courts like
Singapore’s is, at best, awkward (in all
cases), and at worst, illegitimate (in
cases where the arbitral court has no
other basis for exercising jurisdiction
over the non-consenting third party).
It is unclear, however, how often this
extension of jurisdiction happens38 or
whether the public would know if it
did occur, in light of arbitral courts’
sometimes non-public dockets.
The point, however, is that questions of jurisdiction over third parties
test the distinctions between the legitimacy of the court acting as a public
dispute resolution forum on the one
hand or a private dispute resolution
forum on the other. Arbitral courts
suggest that the public/private boundary may be shifting, in international
commercial disputes, to one defined

by the line between authority based on
parties’ consent and authority based
on state sovereignty. Arbitral courts
are trying both to straddle that line
and to circumvent it. State sovereignty
alone, however, does not establish
judicial jurisdiction over everyone
everywhere. Nor does it establish
judicial legitimacy, especially in states
that seek to draw legitimacy from the
strength of their judicial institutions.39
It is circular to ask the courts’ consent-based legitimacy to support the
state’s legitimacy as a sovereign, while
also asking the state’s power to extend
the arbitral court’s power beyond its
original source: the parties’ consent.
This article therefore recommends
that arbitral courts limit the scope of
their jurisdiction — particularly with
respect to questions of expansive
jurisdiction, like jurisdiction over third
parties — based on the scope of contract granting them jurisdiction.
The same limits — and a similar recommendation — echo in the area of
enforcement. One of the most often
cited reasons for choosing arbitration
over litigation is the easy availability of
enforcement of arbitral awards around
the world. But this distinction may be
eroding. Based on a trio of treaties,40 the
difference between easy enforceability
(traditionally associated with arbitral
awards) and more demanding scrutiny
(traditionally associated with court
judgments) may ultimately depend on
whether the parties have agreed to
the forum’s jurisdiction — not whether
that forum was an arbitral tribunal or
a court. Under this framework, it will
be consent, or its absence, that distinguishes between ready international
legitimacy and suspicion — not the difference between an arbitral tribunal
and a court. If that becomes the norm
over time, that may further weaken
distinctions between arbitration and

Judicature

litigation in transnational disputes and
governance more generally.
But as is the case with jurisdiction,
the scope of consent should limit the
scope of enforceability. For example,
if the SICC were to use its authority to
join non-consenting third parties, over
whom the court otherwise would not
have jurisdiction, then foreign courts
should not enforce the resulting judgment against the third party.41

DECISION-MAKERS’ ROLE IN
BUILDING LEGITIMACY
In arbitration, the decision-makers
(arbitrators) also lend sociological
legitimacy because of who they are
and how they are chosen. Arbitrators
appear more neutral because they are
not state actors and possibly do not
share a nationality with one of the
parties, in contrast to judges on traditional courts. Many arbitrators are
well-regarded experts in their fields.
Moreover, they are chosen by the parties, and therefore even the losing
party has helped constitute the tribunal and may feel like it had an advocate
during the decision-making process.
The chair of an arbitration panel — the
third arbitrator chosen by the parties’ chosen co-arbitrators42 — also has
legitimacy based on perceived neutrality because of this selection process.
Arbitral courts rely not only on consent as an arbitration-like basis for
legitimacy, but also on the personal
legitimacy of the decision-makers to
signal the courts’ independence. Thus,
Singapore, Dubai, and the Caymans have
hired international judges from the UK
and elsewhere — to bring with them the
credentials, trustworthiness, and legitimacy that Delaware sought to sell with
its judges and their excellent reputations.43 As non-nationals, these foreign
decision-makers may quell potential
concerns that these courts will exhibit
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bias in favor of local parties or the local
government. They may thus enhance
the perceived legitimacy and independence of the new court.44 Relying on
the legitimacy of foreign experts as
decision-makers is once again appropriated from international arbitration.
Arbitral courts’ staffing also tries to
address common challenges to arbitration’s legitimacy. For example, arbitral
courts adopt their own ethical rules,
warding off arbitration’s problem of
lacking an applicable ethics code.45
And unlike arbitral tribunals, which
commonly allow parties to have a role
in choosing their arbitrators, arbitral courts assign judges to particular
cases. This practice seems aimed at
increasing the likelihood of independence and objectivity and preventing
objections that the arbitral court may
be beholden to the parties before it.
Whether this appropriated legitimacy will ultimately be judged as
credible will depend on how cases play
out in these courts — something we can
observe only if arbitral courts commit
to transparency. Transparency is likewise key to knowing whether arbitral
courts will operate independently. If
government, government-connected,
or otherwise high-influence parties
come before arbitral courts, will the
courts maintain their neutrality? As
the expression goes, “only time will
tell.” But in order for time to tell, the
record cannot be shrouded in secrecy.
These courts are still new and must
be watched for evidence. The Dubai
International Financial Centre (DIFC)
courts, one of the oldest examples of
this new wave of arbitral courts, have
had mixed results. As Matthew Erie
has documented, DIFC Courts have
ruled in favor of the government bodies that have appeared before them,
but they have also ruled against quasigovernment corporations.46 This exam-

ple yields hope but does not totally
alleviate skepticism — and there must
still be transparency in order to monitor arbitral court independence.

PUBLICITY, CONFIDENTIALITY,
AND PARTY AUTONOMY
The success of arbitral courts’ hybrid
approach to legitimacy thus will depend
in large part on how much of the arbitral
courts’ operations the public can see.
This is true not only for the publication
of opinions, but also for the transparency of process, dockets, access, and
other dealings. As the Delaware experiment revealed, keeping confidential
the working of arbitral courts tends to
undermine the institutions’ legitimacy.
Questions of publicity and confidentiality are therefore of utmost importance,
but they may face resistance from
another signature feature of arbitral
courts: party autonomy.
Arbitral courts purport to be public
institutions. One common characteristic of public courts is that they have a
consistent set of procedures and rules
that apply to all who come to them.
Nevertheless, arbitral courts give parties considerable choice and control
over procedural and evidentiary rules.
In many instances, the parties’ interests will be antagonistic towards one
another in a way that balances to yield
normatively acceptable procedural
rules. For example, the plaintiff might
want extensive discovery, the defendant might want minimal discovery,
and in contracting for procedure, they
might reach a compromise solution.
On confidentiality decisions, however, experience teaches that the
parties’ interests will likely be aligned
in favor of confidentiality. But public
access — to courts’ proceedings, records, and decisions — would further
the long-term institutional interest
of the forum and the law. In regular
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arbitration, parties are free to agree
to keep their disputes — including the
proceedings and resulting decisions —
confidential and private. Confidentiality
is not an inherent attribute of international commercial arbitration, but
it is an available option.47 And, when
offered, parties often choose to keep
their disputes secret. That is generally appropriate because the parties
have chosen a private way of settling
their disputes and that resolution
applies only to them. Courts, by contrast, ordinarily limit opportunities for
confidentiality of regular proceedings
and of judicial decisions, and courts
and scholars alike urge the importance of “open justice.” This openness
is important for a number of reasons,
including that the courts make law not
just for the litigating parties but also
for others, they exercise government
power, and they are publicly funded
and provide a public good that the public should be allowed to monitor to
prevent corruption and misuse.
Permitting party control over decisions about confidentiality can make
arbitral courts much closer to private,
rather than public, institutions. The
pitfalls of trusting the openness of
arbitral courts to the parties have been
demonstrated in the court context,
such as in the history of the opioid litigation,48 as well as in the international
commercial arbitration context, where
calls for more institutional transparency have run up against party
preferences.49 Control over confidentiality choices is a little like control
over forum choices — the allocation
of decision-making authority typically
decides the outcome.50
The traditional distinction between
“private arbitration” and “public courts” has long been eroding,
particularly as courts offer parties
more autonomy regarding choice of
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On confidentiality decisions,
however, experience teaches
that the parties’ interests
will likely be aligned in
favor confidentiality.
But public access —
to courts’ proceedings,
records, and decisions —
would further the long-term
institutional interest of the
the law.
forum

of

and

forum, choice of law, and discovery.
But arbitral courts upend the distinction completely. Judges, who usually
control decisions about confidentiality powered by strong presumptions
against it, may still be the ultimate
decision-makers. But arbitral courts
may yield a trend toward party control over confidentiality decisions with
minimal judicial supervision, powered
by presumptions favoring the parties’
preferences. Those preferences are
likely to favor confidentiality.
Structurally, arbitral courts may be
likely to favor pleasing the parties and
accommodating those preferences.
Arbitral courts have put themselves in
this position to cater to their customers
— i.e., potential parties to international
disputes. Offering confidentiality is a
form of “forum selling”51 as a way to
compete with arbitration to attract parties to select the arbitral court in their
forum selection clause or otherwise
choose the arbitral court for disputes.
The originators of the term “forum
selling” suggested that the practice was
problematic when courts were selling
themselves to plaintiffs who maintained unilateral control over forum
choices, but not when parties mutually
agreed on a forum in a forum selection
clause.52 In that latter situation, the

authors assumed parties would choose
the best courts, and courts would be
driven to provide quality proceedings
that would satisfy both sides.
But there are times when parties’
interests conflict with those of the
court and the public. Joshua Karton has
demonstrated that transparency presents such a conflict in international
commercial arbitration.53 The institution needs transparency to sustain
sociological and legal legitimacy in the
long run, but it also needs to offer confidentiality to attract parties in the short
term. In arbitral courts, these competing needs exist to an arguably even
greater extent. Arbitral courts are new,
and therefore need participants. But
they also need to publicize what they
are doing to establish themselves. In
democracies, such open justice is necessary to bolster judicial independence,
build legitimacy, and allow for public
oversight. Arbitral courts in non-democratic states have an even higher
burden to demonstrate to the public
that they are independent and follow
the law. And ultimately, the world of
commercial parties who might choose
to litigate their disputes there will also
be attracted by the legitimacy offered
by transparency, and not just the convenience provided by secrecy.
One might wonder whether arbitral courts’ rules about confidentiality
are or should be constrained by some
higher order law. While the UK
Supreme Court has recently reaffirmed
the principle of “open justice,” it is not
clear whether and how this rule will
bind or persuade arbitral courts in
Singapore, Dubai, or Kazakhstan, even
if those courts operate under the common law tradition. The Third Circuit
held that the Constitution enshrines a
similar principle, thwarting Delaware’s
attempt to create a confidential arbitral court. But it probably would have
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been possible for Delaware (or another
interested state) to circumvent such a
ruling. A revised statute, for example,
could make confidentiality available at
the judge’s discretion, and then set (or
allow judges to set) a low threshold for
granting confidentiality requests (perhaps even not requiring the request to
be bilateral). Such a setup might have
satisfied the Third Circuit. It is also possible that another set of federal judges
might agree with the dissent rather
than the majority in Delaware Coalition.
Regardless of the answer to the constitutional question, the Third Circuit
was right in its more basic conclusion
that confidentiality was the central
problem with the Delaware arbitral
court from an institutional design perspective. Its decision is also supported
by both the judiciary’s interest in the
public interest of access and by arbitral courts’ self-interest in supporting
their budding reputations, legitimacy,
and power.

CONCLUSION
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This article summarizes a more extensive description and analysis of arbitral courts that will be
published in the Virginia Journal of International
Law in 2021. See Pamela K. Bookman, Arbitral
Courts, 61 Va. J. Int’l L. (forthcoming 2021).
See generally Jenny S. Martinez, Towards an International Judicial System, 56 Stan. L. Rev. 429 (2003);
Christopher A. Whytock, The Evolving Forum
Shopping System, 96 Cornell L. Rev. 481 (2011); see
also Gary Born, A New Generation of International
Adjudication, 61 Duke L.J. 775, 776 (2012).
“State” here refers to a sovereign, whether a U.S.
state, foreign country, or foreign locality. See
State, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).
At its most basic, “[a]rbitration is a process by
which parties consensually submit a dispute to a
non-governmental decision-maker, selected by
or for the parties [in accordance with the parties’
agreement to arbitrate], to render a binding decision resolving [that] dispute in accordance with
neutral, judicial procedures affording the parties
an opportunity to be heard.” Gary Born, International Arbitration: Cases and Materials 336 (2d ed.
2015); see also id. at 131–32 (collecting definitions
of arbitration).
See, e.g., John Coyle, Business Courts and Interstate
Competition, 53 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1915 (2012); The
Right Hon. The Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, Lord
Chief Justice of Eng. and Wales, Guest Lecture
at the Grand Court of the Cayman Islands (Mar.
2, 2017), https://www.judiciary.uk/wp-content/
uploads/2017/03/grand-court-of-the-cayman-islands-guest-lecture-march-2017.pdf.

Arbitral courts are widely celebrated
as adopting the “best” of both worlds
of binding adjudication: arbitration and
litigation. But arbitral courts bring perils as well as promise. Arbitral courts
that exercise jurisdiction beyond the
scope of the parties’ consent could
compromise their legitimacy and the
likelihood that their judgments will
be recognized and enforced by other
courts. Arbitral court judges have the
opportunity to be transparent and
vocal in their neutrality — but will need
to reject at least some requests for
confidentiality to build their own reputations as well as the reputations of
their institutions. Arbitral courts that
proceed behind the dark veil of confidentiality, often requested by parties,
could threaten their own legitimacy
and eventually lead to their untimely
demise. Liberal granting of parties’
requests for confidentiality will compromise not only the decisions made
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See Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, § 349 (2009); Del. Ch. Ct.
R. 96–98.
Del. Coal. for Open Gov’t, Inc. v. Strine, 733 F.3d
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